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Abstract
We model media manipulation in which a sender or senders manipulate in-
formation through the media to inuence receivers. We show that if there is
only one sender who has a conditional preference for maintaining its credibil-
ity in reporting accurate information and if the receivers face a coordination
situation without information about their opponentstypes, the sender could
inuence the receivers to make decisions according to the senders primary
preference by manipulating the information through the media, which makes
the report common knowledge. This is true even when the sender and the
receivers have contradictory primary preferences. This result extends to the
cases in which the sender has imperfect information or in which the senders
primary preference is to maintain its credibility. In the case of multiple senders,
however, when there is enough competition among the senders or when simul-
taneous reporting takes place, the receivers could play their favored outcome
against senderspreferences, which sheds light on a solution to the media ma-
nipulation problem.
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1 Introduction
With rapid development of technology, the mass media have become an inuential
force in our daily lives as a means of information transmission. Without a systematic
framework to analyze the e¤ect of the media, we are unaware of the impact of media
and are subject to their hidden yet powerful inuence. This paper intends to make an
initial contribution to the understanding of the systematic operation and the impact
of the media. More specically, this paper provides several simple models in which a
sender or senders manipulate information through the news media, such as newspaper
or television stations, in order to inuence the decision-making process of receivers.
The setting of the models can be a general coordination game with incomplete
information. Here, an arms race game is adopted as the setting of the models not
only because it simplies the model while clearly showing the power of the media,
but also because the results from this setting can easily be generalized into a general
coordination game with incomplete information. In the arms race game, there are
two players, player 1 and player 2, each simultaneously choosing to build weapons or
not to build weapons. In this game, player 2 has two possible types, either hawkish
or dovish. If player 2 is hawkish, she wants to occupy a leading military position
and therefore regards building weapons as a dominant action. If player 2 is dovish,
she wants to maintain a harmonious relationship with player 1. Thus, dovish player
2 prefers not to build weapons as long as player 1 does not build weapons. As a
dovish player who also wants to defend herself, however, dovish player 2 prefers to
build weapons if player 1 builds weapons. In other words, dovish player 2 wants to
match the action of player 1. Player 2s type is her own private information. On the
other hand, player 1 is always dovish, so she always wants to match the action of
player 21. In this arms race game, there are two possible equilibrium outcomes: the
building-weapons outcome in which both players choose to build weapons and the not-
building-weapons outcome in which both players choose not to build weapons. Here,
the not-building-weapons outcome is the favorite outcome for the dovish players.
In the basic model, I introduce a sender into the arms race game. The sender
has the information about player 2s type and would report the information to play-
ers 1 and 2 before they make decisions on weapon building. The following three
assumptions about the sender lead to the unique outcome of this game. First, the
sender reports the information about player 2s type through news media. By the
nature of the news media, the report from the sender is commonly known to both
players. Second, the sender has a preference for player 1 to build weapons. Finally,
the sender has a conditional preference2 for maintaining its credibility in reporting
1In the classic arms race game, both players have two possible types. By designating one players
type as permanent, I simplify the classic arms race game while preserving the same results as the
classic models.
2This model can be considered as a simplied version of the repeated game in which a sender
has two possible types: neutral or biased. A neutral sender always reports truthfully, while on the
other hand, the sole concern of a biased sender is to make player 1 build weapons. In this repeated
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accurate information. Whether a sender can successfully inuence the players or not
is determined by the playersown strategies. If player 1 uses a strategy to ignore
the senders report and consequently the sender cannot inuence player 1 to build
weapons, the sender would choose to preserve its credibility and thus report truthful
information about player 2s type. However, if the sender can successfully a¤ect player
1 to build weapons, then maintaining its credibility in reporting accurate information
is no longer a concern to the sender and it could report untruthful information. With
this sender in the arms race game, the basic model3 shows that the only outcome in
the Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, introduced by Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), is the
building-weapons outcome.
To see why the players cannot achieve the not-building-weapons outcome in equi-
librium, suppose that player 1 tries not to build weapons regardless of the report from
the sender. Under this strategy of player 1, the sender cannot inuence player 1 to
build weapons, so the sender would report truthful information about player 2s type.
Then when the sender reports that player 2 is hawkish, player 1 is certain that player
2 is hawkish and thus would build weapons. Accordingly, player 1 has an incentive to
change her action from not building weapons to building weapons in order to match
player 2s action. Therefore, in equilibrium, player 1 cannot completely ignore the
report from the sender. Once player 1 responds to the senders report, the sender can
inuence player 1 to build weapons by manipulating the information.
The result derived from the basic model shows that news media could be a pow-
erful means of information transmission. By reporting through the news media, the
sender can make player 1 build weapons in accordance with the senders preference,
and therefore players 1 and 2 lose the not-building-weapons outcome, which is a fa-
vorite outcome of the dovish players. In addition, this result is strong because it
is robust against two parameters. The result is robust against the probability that
player 2 is hawkish. It is also robust against the payo¤s to the dovish players when
they achieve the not-building-weapons outcome. That is, no matter how small, but
positive, the probability of player 2s being hawkish or no matter how great the pay-
o¤s to the dovish players in the not-building-weapons outcome, players 1 and 2 cannot
achieve the not-building-weapons outcome.
Moreover, this result is stable from two aspects. First, even if we introduce a
cheap-talk between players 1 and 2 into the basic model, this result does not change.
This is because if the players try to make their decisions according to their cheap-talk,
then the sender cannot inuence the players, which means that the senders primary
game, in response to the behavior that player 1 tries to distinguish a neutral sender from a biased
sender, a biased sender pretends to be neutral in order to preserve its inuence on player 1. In the
basic model, to reect this behavior of the biased sender, the concept of credibility is adopted and
adapted so that the sender considers its credibility only conditionally. For more information about
credibility in static games, see Kartik, Ottaviani, and Squintani (2006).
3This basic model can be exemplied by the Hitlers regime in the World War II. According to
Shirer (1990), German citizens (player 1) openly objected to the war with the Poles (player 2). But,
Hitler (the sender) successfully manipulated German citizensopinions through the news media.
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preference cannot be satised. Thus the sender would reveal the information because
of its conditional preference. As a result, the players have an incentive to change their
strategies, and eventually the sender can successfully inuence the players to play the
senders favored outcome. Second, the setting of the model, the arms race game,
can be replaced with a general coordination game with incomplete information4. In
the general coordination game with incomplete information, if the following three
conditions hold, then the result will be similar to the result in the basic model. First,
in the general coordination game without a sender, the senders favored outcome
must be a possible equilibrium outcome when each player is a normal type, who
does not have a dominant action; in the basic model, the senders primary preference
is to make player 1 build weapons and the building-weapons outcome is a possible
equilibrium outcome when both players are dovish types, who do not have a dominant
action. Second, when each player is normal, the senders favored outcome consists
of each players strict best responses, that is, each player strictly prefers to stick to
her action as long as the others do; in the basic model, each dovish player strictly
prefers to build weapons if the other does so. Third, one of the receiverstypes has a
dominant action that is part of the senders favored outcome; to build weapons, in the
basic model, is a dominant action of hawkish player 2 and it is part of the senders
favored outcome, the building-weapons outcome. Under these three conditions, in
the general coordination game5 with a sender, the normal players and the types who
have dominant actions that are part of the senders favored outcome play the senders
favored outcome. Note that it is also possible that one of the players in the general
game becomes a sender and sends its own information.
Furthermore, this result di¤ers from the results in existing literature on informa-
tion transmission. Crawford and Sobel (1982) and Kartik, Ottaviani, and Squintani
(2006) showed that if a sender and receivers have contradictory preferences, then the
sender cannot inuence the receivers to play the senders favored outcome (see also
Milgrom, 1981; Sobel, 1985; and Krishna and Morgan, 2001). The basic model, on
4For simplicity, the general coordination game is assumed to satisfy the following conditions. i)
Each player has one or several types including a normal type who does not have a dominant action
and the realizations of the playerstypes are independent. ii) When every player is normal, they
solve a coordination game, and when a player is not normal, she has a dominant action.
5For an example of the general coordination game with incomplete information, we can introduce
a blindly peaceful type for player 2, who will not build weapons in any case, into the arms race game.
In this example, if the probability that player 2 is blindly peaceful is not so high that the building-
weapons outcome is a possible equilibrium outcome, and then all types except the blindly peaceful
type build weapons in an equilibrium outcome according to the primary preference of the sender.
Besides, this result does not change even when we introduce a cheap-talk between players 1 and 2
into this example. This is because the sender has the conditional preference for its credibility and
thus the players cannot completely ignore the report from the sender in equilibrium. Therefore, in
these examples, the sender can manipulate information through the media so that the players play
its favored outcome. The same is true with the opposite assumption. If the not-building-weapons
outcome is a possible equilibrium outcome and the senders primary preference is to make player 1
NOT build weapons, then in an equilibrium outcome, player 1 does not build weapons in any case.
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the other hand, shows that if receivers play the coordination game with incomplete
information that satises the aforementioned three conditions, such as an arms race
game in the basic model, and a sender has a conditional preference on its credibil-
ity and reports its information through news media, then the sender can inuence
the receivers to play the senders favored outcome even when there are contradictory
preferences between the sender and the receivers.
The setting of the model, the arms race game, is developed from Schelling (1960)
and Baliga and Sjöström (2004). Schelling argued that reciprocal fear from surprise
attack makes defensive action desirable and can cause a multiplier e¤ect in which both
sides generate and escalate negative expectations of their opponents. This multiplier
e¤ect induces arms race even when the probability of each side being hawkish is not
high. Baliga and Sjöström formally modeled Schellings insight. The aforementioned
arms race di¤ers from Baliga and Sjöström in that uncertainty lies only on one side
and thus there is no multiplier e¤ect. Even so, the basic model still shows that an
arms race is always triggered by the senders will because the sender uses the media
as a means of information transmission and it has the conditional preference.
In this study, reports are relevant to payo¤s, and this property evidently dis-
tinguishes this model from the cheap-talk games developed by Farrell and Gibbons
(1989a), Farrell and Rabin (1996), and Battaglini (2002). In cheap-talk games, talk
is irrelevant to payo¤s. So, one player does not need to believe what other players
talk about, and as a result only if they have a common interest in a degree, their
cheap-talk can be e¤ective (see also Farrell and Gibbons, 1989b; Stein, 1989; Farrell,
1993; Baliga and Morris, 2002; and Aumann and Hart, 2003; and Goltsman, Hörner,
Pavlov, and Squintani, 2007). In the basic model, on the other hand, the payo¤s to
the sender depend on its report as well as on another players action. This is done
by assuming that the sender wants to preserve its credibility in reporting accurate
information. This intention of the sender for its credibility makes the report from the
sender e¤ective even when the sender and the players have contradictory preferences.
As a result, the senders intention for its credibility ironically deprives the dovish
players of their favorite outcome. Regarding main interests, the cheap-talk games
are typically interested in how much information can be delivered in such limited
situations. On the other hand, the basic model does not address this issue, yet it
is intended to show how the sender can manipulate information through the media
instead.
The basic model can be categorized as a signaling game. Its contribution to the
literature of signaling games is to nd su¢ cient conditions under which the sender
can successfully manipulate information through the media and, consequently, to
provide a systematic study about the e¤ect of the media as a means of information
transmission. Nevertheless, the basic model di¤ers from the classical signaling games
developed by Spence (1973), Cho and Kreps (1987), and van Damme (1989) in that
the sender reports player 2s type. In these signaling games, senders only signal their
own types or their own intention about their future actions (see also Bhattacharya,
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1979; Milgrom and Roberts, 1986; Banks and Sobel, 1987; Manelli, 1997).
Besley and Prat (2004) and Baron (2005) also studied media manipulation in
which the senders manipulate information through the media to inuence receivers.
Besley and Prat modeled a situation in which media outlets maintain a cozy relation-
ship with the government. In exchange for compensation, such as a direct monetary
payment or benecial regulations, the media suppress embarrassing information about
the government. Also contributing to this topic, Baron employed information com-
petition between two interest groups, each advocating their positions through news
media to inuence public sentiment. In both papers, the extent to which the media
reports information determines the degree of inuence that the media exert on the
public, which actualizes media manipulation (see also Dyck and Zingales, 2003; and
Strömberg, 2004). That is, more reports bring stronger inuence on the public, and
so the inuence of the media on the decision of the public is exogenously modeled.
In the present study, however, the inuence of the media on the decision of the play-
ers is endogenously created in equilibrium due to the coordination situation that the
receivers face and the senders conditional preference for its credibility.
Section 3 extends the basic model by introducing imperfect information so that the
sender detects imperfect information about player 2s type. Here, if the signal about
player 2s type indicates the true type of player 2 with su¢ ciently high probability,
then the result in the basic model extends to the imperfect information model.
Section 4 examines the opposite case of the basic model in terms of the senders
preferences. In this modied model, the senders primary preference is to preserve its
credibility, and its conditional preference is to inuence the decision-making process of
the players. This is done by assuming that the sender is composed of a private media
outlet whose preferences on playerschoices represent media bias. This assumption
leads to the fact that as long as its credibility remains intact, a prot-maximizing
media outlet manipulates the information to increase the demand for its products.
This modied model concludes that the media outlet can manipulate information,
in order to inuence the players to play a specic outcome, without undermining its
credibility.
Section 5 extends the modied model to incorporate private media competition to
study the e¤ect of media competition on media bias. This media competition model
shows that if the prots of private media outlets are a¤ected by media bias more
than by media competition, then the media outlets can successfully manipulate the
information so that players choose the outcome that satises media outletsconcerns.
However, when there are both media outlets who report truthfully and those who
report untruthfully, if competition among media outlets is strong enough so that
competition brings su¢ cient rewards to the media outlets who report truthfully, then
eventually all media outlets can be forced to report truthfully and receivers can
achieve the not-building-weapons outcome. Therefore, enough competition among the
private media outlets can e¤ectively curb their information manipulation through the
media and consequently reduce their inuences on the receivers. Also, simultaneous
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reporting by at least two media outlets results in an outcome similar to the media
competition case.
Section 6 presents summaries and conclusions.
2 Basic Model
In the basic model, a Ministry of Propaganda is the sender. There are three players;
player 1, player 2, and the Ministry of Propaganda (M). Players 1 and 2 have their
own types. Player 2 can be either hawkish or dovish while player 1 is always dovish.
The probability that player 2 is hawkish is h 2 (0; 1]. In this model, uncertainty lies
only in the type of player 2. M reports either that player 2 is hawkish (H) or that
player 2 is dovish (D). Players 1 and 2 each choose either to Build weapons (B) or
Not to build weapons (N).
This game proceeds as follows. At stage zero, Nature chooses player 2s type.
Only M and player 2 detect player 2s type. At stage one, M reports H or D. What
M has reported becomes common knowledge. At stage two, players 1 and 2 each
simultaneously choose B or N . After all actions are taken, payo¤s are realized.
Nature
M
1 1
M
1
2 2 2 2 2 2 22
1
Haw
kish
 typ
e Dovish type
H D H D
B
NB B
B
B
BB B
B
B
N
BNN N N
N N
NNN NB
Figure 1: Game Tree of the Basic Model
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The payo¤s to M depend on its own reports as well as the playersactions. That
is, given a report r 2 fH;Dg of M and actions a1; a2 2 fB;Ng of the players, a
real number ura1a2 denotes the payo¤ to M when M reports r and players 1 and 2
choose a1 and a2, respectively. For example, uHBN denotes the payo¤ to M when
M reports H and players 1 and 2 choose B and N , respectively. While in the
traditional information transmission models studied by Crawford and Sobel (1982),
Austen-Smith (1990), and Seidmann and Winter (1997), the payo¤s to a sender or
senders depend on receiversactions only, in the present model, however, the payo¤s
to M depend on both its own actions and the playersactions.
Regarding its preferences, the primary preference6 of M is to make player 1 build
weapons; i:e: urBa2 > ur0Na02 for any r; r
0 2 fH;Dg and a2; a02 2 fB;Ng in which
the left side term denotes the payo¤ to M when player 1 builds weapons and the
right side term denotes the payo¤ to M when player 1 does not. M might have a
particular preference on player 2s actions. In this model, however, such a preference
does not a¤ect results as long as the primary preference of M is to make player 1
build weapons. So the preference of M on player 2s action is omitted.
In addition, when M is unable to inuence player 1 to build weapons, the con-
ditional preference of M is to preserve its credibility. In this model, there are two
possible cases in which M might lose its credibility. In one case, M might lose its
Credibility related to Truthfulness (CT ). A hawkish player has a dominant action B.
So ifM has reported H and player 2 plays N , then player 1 is certain thatM has lied,
and thus M would lose its CT . Hence if M cannot a¤ect player 1 to build weapons
and expects player 2 to play N , then M prefers to choose D; i:e: uDNN > uHNN . In
the other case, M might lose its Credibility related to Accurate Warning (CAW ). If
M expects player 2 to play B and reports D, then M would fail to warn player 1
of the danger that player 2 would build weapons and thus lose its CAW . Hence if
M cannot a¤ect player 1 to build weapons and expects player 2 to play B, then M
prefers to report H; i:e: uHNB > uDNB.
However, not every inequality stated above to summarize the preferences of M
a¤ects the outcomes in equilibrium. Of the aforementioned inequalities, only the
four listed below inuence the outcomes. In this paper, emphasis is placed on the
outcomes in equilibrium. Therefore, for simplicity, only the following four inequalities
are assumed to describe the preferences of the Ministry of Propaganda, M ;
i) uHBB > uDNN and uDBB > uHNN for the primary preference;
ii) uDNN > uHNN for CT ; and iii) uHNB > uDNB for CAW .
The payo¤s to players 1 and 2 are given by the following matrixes. In these ma-
trixes, player 1 chooses a row and player 2 a column,
6In the general coordination games with incomplete information, the primary preference of M
can be exible. So if the general games satisfy the aforementioned three conditions, then no matter
what Ms primary preference is, M can successfully inuence normal receivers, who do not have
dominant actions, to play Ms favored outcome.
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When player 2 is hawkish
N B
N !; 3 0; 4
B 2; 0 1; 1
When player 2 is dovish
N B
N !; ! 0; 2
B 2; 0 1; 1
Table 1: Payo¤Matrixes of Players 1 and 2
such that ! > 2 where the rst entry in each cell is player 1s payo¤ for the cor-
responding actions and the second entry player 2s. Player 1 is always dovish. A
dovish player prefers to match the action of the other and prefers the NN outcome
to the BB. For a hawkish player, B is a dominant action. So the BB outcome is the
only pure-strategy equilibrium in the left side matrix. Moreover, when both players
1 and 2 are dovish, they want to match the action of the other. Consequently, in the
right side matrix, there are two pure-strategy equilibria, the NN outcome and the
BB. This two-player setting is similar to Baliga and Sjöström (2004).
The arms race game without M could have two pure-strategy Perfect Bayesian
equilibrium outcomes. Players can achieve the BB outcomes regardless of player 2s
type in which playersexpected payo¤s are ones. Also, if the probability h that player
2 is hawkish and the payo¤ ! in the NN outcome satisfy that ! 2
! 1 > h, then the NB
outcome when player 2 is hawkish and the NN when player 2 is dovish is a possible
outcome combination in equilibrium. In this outcome, players 1 and 2 have their
expected payo¤s (1  h)! and 4h+(1  h)!, respectively, and therefore both players
prefer the latter outcome combination to the former because of the higher expected
payo¤s in the latter. Then, how does introducing M into the arms race game change
the results? Theorem 1 answers this question.
Theorem 1 Pure-strategy Perfect Bayesian equilibria exist, and in the equilibrium
outcomes players 1 and 2 choose Bs.
Proof. Here, every pure-strategy of player 1 is examined. First, let player 1 play
B always; i:e: (B;B). Note that a dovish player prefers to match the action of
the other player. On the other hand, a hawkish player has the dominant action B.
Hence only player 2s strategy under which she always plays B, i:e: (B;B;B;B),
satises the best response to player 1s strategy in each continuation game. Finally,
player 1s strategy (B;B) satises the best response to (B;B;B;B) in each continu-
ation game. In this case, if uHBB > uDBB, then M prefers to report H always, i:e:
(H;H). Accordingly, the strategy prole f(H;H); (B;B); (B;B;B;B)g is an equi-
librium. Similarly, the following strategy proles are equilibria; if uHBB < uDBB,
then f(D;D); (B;B); (B;B;B;B)g; and if uHBB = uDBB, then f(rH ; rD); (B;B);
(B;B;B;B)g for rH ; rD 2 fH;Dg, where (rH ; rD) species that M reports rH when
it detects a hawkish type and rD when it detects a dovish type. In all the cases,
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players always choose Bs in the outcomes. Therefore, there exists a pure-strategy
equilibrium of which players choose Bs in the outcome.
Second, let player 1 play B only when M has reported H; (B;N). Then only
player 2s strategy under which she plays N only when player 2 is dovish and M has
reported D, i:e: (B;B;B;N), satises the best response in each continuation game.
Next, the best response of M to these strategies is to report H when M detects a
dovish type because uHBB > uDNN , which denotes the primary preference of M .
In this case, rst, let M report D when it detects a hawkish type. Then M would
report D when it detects a hawkish type and would report H when it detects a dovish
type. So player 1 knows that player 2 is hawkish when M has reported D. Hence
player 1 has an incentive to change her action from N to B when M has reported D.
Consequently, the strategy proles that contain player 1s strategy (B;N) and Ms
strategy under which M reports D only when it detects a hawkish type, i:e: (D;H),
cannot be an equilibrium. Second, let M report H when it detects a hawkish type,
then the player 1s strategy (B;N) satises the best response in each continuation
game. Hence players choose Bs in this outcome.7 Therefore, if a strategy prole in
which player 1 plays the strategy (B;N) is an equilibrium, then players choose Bs in
the outcome of this equilibrium.
Third, let player 1 play N only when M has reported H; (N;B). Then only
player 2s strategy under which she plays N only when player 2 is dovish and M has
reported H, i:e: (B;B;N;B), satises the best response in each continuation game.
Next, the best response of M to these strategies is to report D when it detects a
dovish type because uDBB > uHNN , the primary preference of M . Similar to the
previous situation, if M takes the action H when it detects a hawkish type, then the
strategy proles in which player 1 plays (N;B) and M plays (H;D) cannot be an
equilibrium. On the other hand, ifM reports D when it detects a hawkish type, then
players choose Bs in this outcome.8 Therefore, if a strategy prole in which player 1
plays (N;B) is an equilibrium, then players choose Bs in this equilibrium outcome.
Finally, let player 1 play N always; (N;N). Then only player 2s strategy under
which she plays N only when she is dovish, i:e: (B;B;N;N), satises the best re-
sponse to player 1s strategy in each continuation game. Next, the best response of
M is to report H when it detects a hawkish type because uHNB > uDNB, the condi-
tional preference for CAW , and to report D when it detects a dovish type because
uDNN > uHNN , the conditional preference for CT . Hence when M has reported H,
player 1 has an incentive to change her action from N to B because she is certain
that player 2 is hawkish and thus player 2 will choose B. Therefore, the strategy
proles in which player 1 plays the strategy (N;N) cannot be an equilibrium.
Theorem 1 means that only the BB outcomes are possible in pure-strategy perfect
bayesian equilibrium and M successfully manipulates the information through the
news media. Therefore, introducing M into the arms race game lowers the players
7If uHBB  uDNB holds, then f(H;H); (B;N); (B;B;B;N)g is a perfect bayesian equilibrium.
8If uDBB  uHNB holds, then f(D;D); (N;B); (B;B;N;B)g is a perfect bayesian equilibrium.
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payo¤s. This result is strong in that it does not depend on h (> 0), the probability
that player 2 is hawkish, and ! (> 2), the payo¤ to the dovish players in the NN
outcome9. In addition, this result is stable in that any cheap-talk between players 1
and 2 cannot change the result and in that the setting of the model could be replaced
with the general coordination game with incomplete information while preserving the
result similar to Theorem 1.
In contrast to the outcomes in pure-strategy equilibrium, the outcomes in mixed-
strategy equilibrium can result in players choosing Ns with positive probabilities.
However, a mixed-strategy equilibrium has negative features for the players. First,
the expected payo¤s in mixed-strategy equilibrium is relatively small compared with
the expected payo¤s in the combination of the NN outcome and the NB. If player
1 or player 2 is indi¤erent between playing B or N , then her expected payo¤ in that
information set is !
! 1 , which is less than 2, no matter which mixed strategy she
plays. If ! is large enough, then !
! 1 is pretty small compared with !. Second, the
set of parameters that admit mixed-strategy equilibria has a small size under the
following assumptions. Suppose that uHBB > uDBB holds and the di¤erence between
uHBN and uDBN , or between uHNN and uDNN is large enough. Then the set of the
parameters that admit mixed-strategy equilibria has measure zero.
3 Imperfect Information
The basic model is extended to the case in which M observes an imperfect signal
about player 2s type. So in this extended model, instead of directly detecting player
2s type, M detects a signal that is exogenously given and is correlated with player
2s type. However, the signal can be empty. If the signal is empty, then it does
not reveal any information about player 2s type. The probability that the signal
indicates a hawkish type is pHH when player 2 is hawkish and is pDH when player
2 is dovish. The probability that the signal indicates a dovish type is pHD when
player 2 is hawkish and is pDD when player 2 is dovish. Thus the probability that
M detects an empty signal is pHE = 1  pHH   pHD when player 2 is hawkish and is
pDE = 1  pDH   pDD when player 2 is dovish.
Here, M has three actions, H, D, and E. The action E denotes an empty report.
We can regard E as no new information reported. In this extended model,M has one
more option, E, than in the basic model. If M tries to report truthfully, it cannot
report anything when it detects an empty signal. Therefore, this setting reects
the fact that M might report truthfully because of its conditional preference. The
other settings are the same as in the basic model except for the interpretation of the
conditional preference of M .
9If ! is large enough, then players 1 and 2 have an incentive to pay M not to report anything.
This incentive of the players can be an interesting topic to study. This model, however, does not
address this topic in order to focus on the media as a means of information transmission.
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In this imperfect information model, M might report H by mistaking a dovish
type for a hawkish type. Hence player 1 does not know whether or not M gave
a wrong report on purpose. As a result, M might not lose its credibility related to
truthfulness when it has given a wrong report. Even then,M would lose its Credibility
related to Accurate Forecast (CAF ) if it fails to correctly forecast the action of player
2. This is because a hawkish type has the dominant action B and by reporting H,
M can forecast the action B. Accordingly, when M is unable to inuence player 1 to
build weapons, M prefers to report H only when it expects that player 2 would play
B. In this model, therefore, the conditional preference of M is to preserve its CAF .
The primary preference of M is still to make player 1 build weapons. Consequently,
the following inequalities are assumed to describe the preferences10 of the Ministry of
Propaganda, M , with imperfect information;
i) uHBB > maxfuDNB; uDNN ; uENB; uENNg, uDBB > maxfuHNB; uHNN ; uENB; uENNg,
and uEBB > maxfuHNB; uHNN ; uDNB; uDNNg for the primary preference; and
ii) uHNB > maxfuDNB; uENBg and uDNN > uHNN for CAF .
Theorem 2 shows that if the signal about player 2s type is informative, then
Theorem 1 extends to the imperfect information model. More specically, if pHH ,
the probability that the signal correctly indicates a hawkish type, and pDD, the
probability that the signal correctly indicates a dovish type, are high enough, then
players 1 and 2 choose Bs in the equilibrium outcomes. Denitions 1 and 2 prescribe
the levels of informativeness of the signal at which the signal could inuence the
decision-making process of M and player 1. Since player 2 knows her own type, the
signal does not directly inuence the decision of player 2. Hence the conditions in
Denitions 1 and 2 are su¢ cient to support a result similar to Theorem 1.
Denition 1 exhibits the levels of informativeness of the signal to M . The infor-
mativeness of the signal is evaluated based on the payo¤s to M .
Denition 1 Suppose that uHNB > maxfuDNB; uENBg and uDNN > uHNN , CAF .
Then the signal is said to be informative to M if the probabilities of the signals
10For Theorem 2, it su¢ ces to assume that uHBB > maxfhsHDuDNB+(1 h)sDDuDNNhsHD+(1 h)sDD ;
hsHDuENB+(1 h)sDDuENN
hsHD+(1 h)sDD ;
hsHEuDNB+(1 h)sDEuDNN
hsHE+(1 h)sDE ;
hsHEuENB+(1 h)sDEuENN
hsHE+(1 h)sDE g instead of uHBB >
maxfuDNB ; uDNN ; uENB ; uENNg; to assume that uDBB > maxfhsHDuHNB+(1 h)sDDuHNNhsHD+(1 h)sDD ;
hsHDuENB+(1 h)sDDuENN
hsHD+(1 h)sDD ;
hsHEuHNB+(1 h)sDEuHNN
hsHE+(1 h)sDE ;
hsHEuENB+(1 h)sDEuENN
hsHE+(1 h)sDE g instead of uDBB >
maxfuHNB ; uHNN ; uENB ; uENNg; and to assume that uEBB > maxfhsHDuHNB+(1 h)sDDuHNNhsHD+(1 h)sDD ;
hsHDuDNB+(1 h)sDDuDNN
hsHD+(1 h)sDD ;
hsHEuHNB+(1 h)sDEuHNN
hsHE+(1 h)sDE ;
hsHEuDNB+(1 h)sDEuDNN
hsHE+(1 h)sDE g instead of uEBB >
maxfuHNB ; uHNN ; uDNB ; uDNNg. These stronger assumptions are made for simplicity. However,
they are innocuous in that they match the preferences of M , whose primary concern is to make
player 1 build weapons.
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satisfy the following two inequalities;
hpHHuHNB + (1  h)pDHuHNN
hpHH + (1  h)pDH > (1)
maxfhpHHuDNB + (1  h)pDHuDNN
hpHH + (1  h)pDH ;
hpHHuENB + (1  h)pDHuENN
hpHH + (1  h)pDH g and
hpHDuHNB + (1  h)pDDuHNN
hpHD + (1  h)pDD <
hpHDuDNB + (1  h)pDDuDNN
hpHD + (1  h)pDD . (2)
Suppose that player 1 plays the strategy that species that she always plays N ,
i.e. (N;N;N), and that player 2 plays the strategy that species that she plays B
only when she is hawkish, i:e: (B;B;B;N;N;N). In this case, M cannot inuence
player 1 to build weapons. If M fails to correctly forecast the action of player 2, then
M gains nothing but loses its CAF . So if the signals indicate the true type of player 2
with signicantly high probabilities, then M would truthfully report what it detects.
Given the payo¤s to M , inequalities 1 and 2 provide precise levels of probabilities
with which M prefers to report truthfully. More concretely, inequality 1 shows that
M prefers to report H when it detects a hawkish type and inequality 2 shows that
M prefers not to report H when it detects a dovish type.
Denition 2 formulates the levels of informativeness of the signal to player 1.
Similar to the case of M , the informativeness of the signal is evaluated based on the
payo¤s to player 1.
Denition 2 The signal is said to be informative to player 1 if the probabilities
of the signals satisfy the following two inequalities;
hpHH + 2(1  h)pDH
hpHH + (1  h)pDH >
!(1  h)pDH
hpHH + (1  h)pDH and (3)
h(pHH + pHE) + 2(1  h)(pDH + pDE)
h(pHH + pHE) + (1  h)(pDH + pDE) >
!(1  h)(pDH + pDE)
h(pHH + pHE) + (1  h)(pDH + pDE) .
(4)
First, let M report H only when it detects the signal of a hawkish type. Then
inequality 3 provides precise levels of probabilities with which player 1 prefers to play
B when M has reported H. Second, let M report H only when it detects either the
signal of a hawkish type or an empty signal. Then inequality 4 provides precise levels
of probabilities with which player 1 prefers to play B when M has reported H.
Theorem 2 Pure-strategy Perfect Bayesian equilibria exist, and if the signal is in-
formative to both M and player 1, then in the equilibrium outcomes players 1 and 2
choose Bs.
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Proof. It is easily seen that there exists an equilibrium that contains player 1s
strategy (B;B;B) and player 2s strategy (B;B;B;B;B;B), which specify that they
always play Bs. In the outcomes of this equilibrium, players play Bs. Therefore, it
su¢ ces to show that if a strategy prole is an equilibrium, then players play Bs in
the outcomes of the strategy prole.
Let player 1 play N only when M has reported E; i:e: (B;B;N). Then only
player 2s strategy under which she plays N only when she is dovish and M has
reported E, i:e: (B;B;B;B;B;N), satises the best response in each continuation
game. Note that if M reports E, then its expected payo¤ is a weighted average
between uENB and uENN . Thus the best response of M to the players strategies
is not to report E no matter what M detects because uHBB > maxfuENB; uENNg,
the primary preference of M . Finally, player 1s strategy (B;B;N) satises the best
response in each continuation game. Therefore, players choose Bs in this outcome.
Similarly, players choose Bs in the equilibrium outcomes in which player 1 plays the
strategies (B;N;B), (B;N;N), (N;B;B), (N;B;N), or (N;N;B).
Finally, let player 1 play (N;N;N). Then only player 2s strategy under which she
plays N only when she is dovish, i:e: (B;B;B;N;N;N), satises the best response
in each continuation game. Under these strategies, M prefers to report H when it
detects a hawkish type and prefers not to report H when it detects a dovish type
because the signal is informative to M . Then player 1 has an incentive to change her
action from N to B when M has reported H, because the signal is also informative
to player 1. Therefore, the strategy proles in which player 1 plays the strategy
(N;N;N) cannot be an equilibrium.
Corollary 1 There exists " > 0 such that if minfpHH ; pDDg > 1   ", then the
outcomes in pure-strategy Perfect Bayesian equilibrium are that players 1 and 2 always
choose Bs while M reports H, D, or E.
Proof. Since pDH  1   pHH and pHD  1   pDD, this result directly follows from
Theorem 2 and inequalities 1, 2, 3, and 4.
We have examined and extended the basic model in which a senders primary
preference is to inuence playerschoices, such as by making player 1 build weapons,
and its conditional preference is to preserve its credibility. In the next section, we
study how the changes of the senders value on its credibility a¤ects outcomes. For this
purpose, the opposite case of the basic model will be considered in which a senders
primary preference is to preserve its credibility and its conditional preference is to
inuence players choices. This is done by assuming that a private media outlet
who values its credibility most has its own preferences on playerschoices and so the
private media outlet tries to manipulate information.
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4 Media Bias: Senders Value on its Credibility
In this modied model, a private media outlet is the sender itself, and player 1 is the
main audience to this media outlet. So, there are three players; player 1, player 2
and the private media outlet (M). The other settings are the same as in the basic
model except for the payo¤s to M .
The payo¤s to M depend on its reports and the action of player 2. That is, given
a report r 2 fH;Dg of M and an action a2 2 fB;Ng of player 2, a real number ura2
denotes the payo¤ to M when M reports r and player 2 chooses a2. This setting
reects the fact that M is mainly an information provider and the information from
M would be evaluated in conjunction with the action of player 2. Thus the payo¤ to
M is not a¤ected by the action of player 1. This payo¤ setting for the private media
outlet, M , could be considered the counterpart of the payo¤ setting for the Ministry
of Propaganda in the basic model in terms of the action of player 1, since the payo¤
to the Ministry of Propaganda is most a¤ected by the action of player 1.
Furthermore, in contrast to the Ministry of Propaganda, the primary preference
of the private media outlet, M , is to preserve its credibility. Just like in the basic
model, there are two possible cases in whichM might lose its credibility; it may lose its
Credibility related to Truthfulness (CT ) or its Credibility related to Accurate Warning
(CAW ). Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) studied the behavior of the media outlets
who prefer to provide accurate information, and they presented empirical evidence of
such behavior. They also showed that the importance of credibility in media markets
has been emphasized by the management of media outlets. For example, Heyward
(2004), president of CBS News, remarked, Nothing is more important to CBS than
our credibility(see also Kirkpatrick and Fabrikant, 2003; and Rather, 2004).
When M can preserve its credibility, M is assumed to prefer the case in which it
correctly warns player 1 of the danger of player 2 than the case in which it correctly
predicts peace, i:e: uHB > uDN 11. This preference represents media bias. This as-
sumption about the media bias reects the following intuition: player 2s developing
new weapons i) makes player 1 feel more insecure; so ii) induces player 1, who is the
main audience to M , to pay more attention to M ; and thus iii) eventually increases
the prot ofM by expanding the demand for the products ofM . This kind of assump-
tion about media bias is not new in economic literature. Mullainathan and Shleifer
(2005) modeled media bias based on a similar assumption in which prot-maximizing
media outlets slant news stories to increase the demand for their products.
Formally, the following inequalities are assumed to describe the preferences of the
private media outlet, M ;
i) minfuDB; uDNg > uHN for CT ; ii) uHB > uDB for CAW ; and
iii) uHB > uDN for the media bias.
11In the general coordination games with incomplete information, similar to the case of the basic
model, the conditional preference of M can be exible.
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with these preferences of M , we can derive a result similar to Theorem 1.
Theorem 3 The unique outcome in pure-strategy Perfect Bayesian equilibrium is
that M reports H and players 1 and 2 choose Bs. If uHN is small enough, there is
no mixed strategy equilibrium except pure-strategy equilibrium.
Proof. The proof of the rst assertion is omitted because it is similar to the proof
of Theorem 1.
To prove the second assertion, let  be the probability with which M reports H
when it detects a dovish type. Also, let a2 and b2 be the probabilities with which
dovish player 2 chooses B when M has reported H and chooses B when M has
reported D, respectively. Finally, Let
a02 
b2uDB + (1  b2)uDN   uHN
uHB   uHN and
a002 
(1  h)(!   2)  h
(1  h)(!   1) .
If a2 is equal to a02, M is indi¤erent between playing H or D when it detects a dovish
type. Also, if a2 is equal to a002, player 1 is indi¤erent between playing B or N when
M has reported H. However, given payo¤ parameters and h, if uHN is small enough,
then a02 is greater than a
00
2 for any b2;  2 [0; 1].
Let a1 be the probability with which player 1 chooses B when M has reported
H. First, if a2 < a02, then M prefers to play D when it detects a dovish type. Note
that M prefers to play H when it detects a hawkish type because uHB > uDB, the
primary preference for CAW . Then player 1 knows that player 2 is hawkish when
M has reported H. Hence, player 1 prefers to play a1 = 1. Second, if a002 < a2, then
player 1 prefers to play a1 = 1. If uHN is small enough, then a2 < a02 or a
00
2 < a2
because a002 < a
0
2. Hence player 1 would play only a1 = 1, and thus player 2 of a dovish
type would also play only a2 = 1. ThenM would report only H because uHB > uDB,
the primary preference for CAW , and uHB > uDN , the media bias. Therefore, there
exists only a pure-strategy equilibrium.
Theorem 3 shows that even when the primary preference of the sender is its
credibility, the receivers do not benet more than they do in the basic model. This is
because the availability of the information fromM removes the possibility for players
to choose Ns. Consequently, Ms warning to player 1 induces both players to choose
Bs.
From Ms point of view, the worst payo¤ is when it is proved to have lied. Only
the payo¤ parameter uHN denotes this worst payo¤. So, lower uHN means that M
values its credibility related to truthfulness, CT , more. Theorem 3 implies that more
value placed on the senders CT could result in worse outcomes for the receivers by
removing a mixed-strategy equilibrium. Also, the payo¤ uHN could be considered
to be the punishment that player 1 inicts on M when M has veriably lied. This
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is because player 1 is Ms main audience and so the payo¤s to M depend largely
on player 1s interest in Ms information. Then Theorem 3 implies that player 1
cannot improve her expected payo¤ by punishing M when M has veriably lied and
sometimes player 1 could even lower her expected payo¤ by punishing M .
DeFleur and Ball-Rokeach (1989) and Morris and Shin (2002) also analyzed the
e¤ects of information from the media (see also Gamson, Croteau, Hoynes, and Sasson,
1992; and Bernhardt, Krasa, and Polborn, 2006). They assumed that the degree of
inuence that the media exert on the public is determined by the extent to which the
media reports its information, and thus the inuence of the media on the public was
exogenously modeled. In the present model, in contrast to their works, the structure
of the model endogenously creates the inuence of the media on the playersdecision-
making process.
We have seen two kinds of information transmission models: the basic model and
the media bias model. In both models, there is only one sender, and the sender
achieves its favored outcome by manipulating information through the news media.
Then, what would occur if there are more than one sender? If there are more than one
sender, the senders could compete with one another. Does the competition matter in
these information transmission models? Does reporting simultaneously or reporting
sequentially make a di¤erence? The next section answers these questions.
5 Media Competition: Multiple Senders
In this model, I extend the previous model by introducing another private media
outlet. Therefore, there are four players; player 1, player 2, media outlet 1 (M1), and
media outlet 2 (M2). Player 1 is still the main audience to both M1 and M2. The
media outlets report sequentially or simultaneously. When they report sequentially,
M1 reports rst. The other settings are the same as in the media bias model except
the payo¤s to the media outlets.
The payo¤s to each outlet depend on the reports from the other outlet as well as
its own reports and the action of player 2. That is, given reports r1; r2 2 fH;Dg
of the media outlets and an action a2 2 fB;Ng of player 2, a real number uir1r2a2
denotes the payo¤ toMi for i 2 f1; 2g whenM1 reports r1, M2 reports r2, and player
2 chooses a2. This setting allows us to examine the e¤ect of media competition.
Regarding their preferences, just like in the media bias model, the primary pref-
erence of the media outlets is to preserve their credibility: CT and CAW . In this
model, the conditional preference of the media outlets depends on both media bias
and media competition. The media outlets have the same bias as in the media bias
model. So the media outlets prefer the case in which they correctly warn player 1
of the danger of player 2 than the case in which they correctly predict peace. The
following inequalities represent all possible cases of media bias; minfu1HHB; u1HDBg >
maxfu1DHN ; u1DDNg and minfu2HHB; u2DHBg > maxfu2HDN ; u2DDNg. Media compe-
tition imposes another condition for the payo¤s to the media outlets by tempt-
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ing them to occupy a leading position in competition. That is, in competition,
media outlets have more incentive to predict correctly while others predict incor-
rectly than while others also predict correctly. The following inequalities describe all
possible cases of media competition; minfu1DHN ; u1HDBg > maxfu1HHB; u1DDNg and
minfu2HDN ; u2DHBg > maxfu2HHB; u2DDNg.
However, the following two inequalities for media competition u1DHN > u
1
HHB and
u2HDN > u
2
HHB directly contradict the inequalities for media bias u
1
DHN < u
1
HHB
and u2HDN < u
2
HHB. Therefore, there are two possible cases: one case in which
bias dominates competition and the remaining case in which bias does not dominate
competition. When bias dominates competition and the private media outlets report
sequentially, the following inequalities are assumed to describe the preferences of the
media outlets;
i) minfu2HDB; u2HDNg > u2HHN for CT ;
ii) u1HHB > maxfu1DHB; u1DDBg and u2HHB > u2HDB for CAW ; and
iii) u1HHB > maxfu1DDN ; u1DHNg and u2HHB > u2HDN for the media bias.
When bias does not dominate competition and the private media outlets report se-
quentially, the following inequalities are assumed to describe the preferences12 of the
media outlets;
i) u1DDN > u
1
HDN and u
2
DDN > u
2
DHN for CT ;
ii) u1HHB > maxfu1DHB; u1DDBg and u2HHB > u2HDB for CAW ; and
iii) u2HDN  u2HHB for the weakly dominant media competition.
Note that when bias dominates competition, u2HHB > u
2
HDN is assumed. On the other
hand, when bias does not dominate competition, u2HHB  u2HDN is assumed. Finally,
when the private media outlets report simultaneously, the following inequalities are
assumed to describe the preferences13 of the media outlets;
i) u1DDN > u
1
HDN and u
2
DDN > u
2
DHN for CT ; and
ii) u1HHB > u
1
DHB and u
2
HHB > u
2
HDB for CAW .
Theorem 4 Suppose that the media outlets report sequentially. If bias dominates
competition, then the unique outcome in pure-strategy Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
12For Theorem 4, it su¢ ces to assume that u1DDN  u1HDN and u2DDN  u2DHN instead of u1DDN >
u1HDN and u
2
DDN > u
2
DHN ; and to assume that u
1
HHB  maxfu1DHB ; u1DDBg and u2HHB  u2HDB
instead of u1HHB > maxfu1DHB ; u1DDBg and u2HHB > u2HDB . These stronger assumptions are made
in accordance with the preferences about credibility.
13For Theorem 4, it su¢ ces to assume that u1DDN  u1HDN and u2DDN  u2DHN instead of
u1DDN > u
1
HDN and u
2
DDN > u
2
DHN ; and to assume that u
1
HHB  u1DHB and u2HHB  u2HDB
instead of u1HHB > u
1
DHB and u
2
HHB > u
2
HDB . These stronger assumptions are made in accordance
with the preferences about credibility.
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is that both outlets report Hs and players choose Bs. In addition, if u2HHN is small
enough, there is no mixed-strategy equilibrium except pure-strategy equilibrium. How-
ever, if bias does not dominate competition, then there exists a pure-strategy Perfect
Bayesian equilibrium in which the media outlets report Hs and players choose Bs
when player 2 is hawkish and the media outlets report Ds and players choose Ns
when player 2 is dovish. Suppose that the media outlets report simultaneously. Then
there also exists the pure-strategy Perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which the media
outlets report Hs and players choose Bs when player 2 is hawkish and the media
outlets report Ds and players choose Ns when player 2 is dovish.
Proof. First, suppose that the media outlets report sequentially. It is easily seen
that there exists an equilibrium outcome in which players 1 and 2 play Bs. Therefore,
it su¢ ces to show that if a strategy prole is an equilibrium, then players play Bs in
the outcomes of the strategy prole.
Let player 1 play B when both outlets have reported Hs. Then the best response
of player 2 to this action is to play B when both outlets have reported Hs. Next, the
best response of M2 to these actions is to play H when M1 has reported H because
u2HHB > u
2
HDB, CAW , and u
2
HHB > u
2
HDN , the media bias. Also, the best response
of M1 to these actions is to play H because u1HHB > maxfu1DHB; u1DDBg, CAW , and
u1HHB > maxfu1DDN ; u1DHNg, the media bias. Finally, the best response of player 1
is to play B when both outlets have reported Hs. Therefore, in this outcome, both
outlets report Hs and players choose Bs.
Let player 1 play N when both outlets have reported Hs. Then the best response
of dovish player 2 is to play N when both outlets have reported Hs. Next, the best
response of M2 is to play D when it detects a dovish type and M1 has reported H
because minfu2HDB; u2HDNg > u2HHN , CT . Note that if the media outlets detect a
hawkish type, then they know that player 2 would play B, and thus they prefer to
report Hs because u2HHB > u
2
HDB and u
1
HHB > maxfu1DHB; u1DDBg, CAW . Hence,
player 1 can be certain that player 2 is hawkish when both outlets have reported Hs.
Consequently, player 1 has an incentive to change her action from N to B when both
outlets have reported Hs. Therefore, a strategy prole in which player 1 plays N
when both outlets have reported Hs cannot be an equilibrium. This completes the
proof of the rst assertion.
The proof of the second assertion is omitted because it is similar to the proof in
Theorem 3.
To prove the third and the fourth assertions, let player 1 play B only when both
outlets have reportedHs; i:e: (B;N;N;N). Then only player 2s strategy under which
she plays B either when she is hawkish or when both outlets have reported Hs, i:e:
(B;B;B;B;B;N;N;N), satises the best response in each continuation game.
Suppose that bias does not dominate competition. Then when M2 detects a
dovish type, one of the best responses of M2 is to report D no matter what M1 has
reported because u2DDN > u
2
DHN , CT , and u
2
HDN  u2HHB, the weakly dominant
media competition. Next, when M1 detects a dovish type, the best response of M1
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is to report D because u1DDN > u
1
HDN , CT . Note that if M1 detects a hawkish
type, then it would report H because u1HHB > maxfu1DHB; u1DDBg, CAW . Also,
if M1 has reported H and M2 detects a hawkish type, then M2 would report H
because u2HHB > u
2
HDB, CAW . Under these strategies of player 2, M1, and M2,
player 1s strategy (B;N;N;N) satises the best response in each continuation game.
Therefore, there exists an action r2HD 2 fH;Dg of M2 such that the strategy prole
f(H;D); (H; r2HD; D;D); (B;N;N;N); (B;B;B;B;B;N;N;N)g is an equilibrium,
where r2D species the action of M2 when it detects a hawkish type and M1 has
reported D. In this strategy prole, the media outlets report Hs and players choose
Bs when player 2 is hawkish and the media outlets report Ds and players choose Ns
when player 2 is dovish.
Finally, suppose that the media outlets report simultaneously. Then when the
outlets detect a hawkish type, each outlet prefers to report H if the other outlet
would report H because u1HHB > u
1
DHB and u
2
HHB > u
2
HDB, CAW . Also, when
the outlets detect a dovish type, each prefers to report D if the other would report
D because u1DDN > u
1
HDN and u
2
DDN > u
2
DHN , CT . Finally, player 1s strategy
(B;N;N;N) satises the best response in each continuation game. Therefore, the
strategy prole f(H;D); (H;D); (B;N;N;N); (B;B;B;B;B;N;N;N)g is a pure-
strategy equilibrium and in this equilibrium the media outlets report Hs and players
choose Bs when player 2 is hawkish and the media outlets report Ds and players
choose Ns when player 2 is dovish.
Therefore, as long as bias dominates competition and the media outlets report
sequentially, players 1 and 2 cannot improve their expected payo¤s. Just like in the
media bias model, the punishment for an untruthful report does not improve players
expected payo¤s, and sometimes even lowers their payo¤s. However, media competi-
tion and simultaneous reporting each can make the media outlets report truthfully,
and consequently players can improve their expected payo¤s. In fact, the outcome
combination in which players 1 and 2 play Bs when player 2 is hawkish and they
play Ns when player 2 is dovish gives player 1 the best payo¤ out of all outcome
combinations such that hawkish player 2 plays B, and player 1 can achieve this com-
bination only when the media outlets reveal the information about player 2s type.
Also, when there are more than one sender in the basic model, if the senders report
simultaneously or if competition among the senders is strong enough, then players
can achieve this outcome combination. Therefore, enough competition and si-
multaneous reporting can each solve media manipulation problems in this
study.
The media competition model can be extended by introducing more media outlets
and imperfect signals about player 2s type. In this case, if bias dominates competi-
tion, then we can derive a result similar to Theorems 2 and 4. That is, if the signal
is informative to player 1 and to the media outlets, then the unique outcome in pure-
strategy equilibrium is that all outlets report Hs and players choose Bs. However, if
competition dominates bias, then the result depends on media outletsherd behavior
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in reporting, which was studied by Scharfstein and Stein (1990) and Banerjee (1992),
and the result might di¤er from Theorems 2 and 4. Here, herd behavior in reporting
means that media outlets just follow other outletsactions regardless of their own
information about player 2s type.
To see how the result can be a¤ected by the herd behavior, suppose that player
1 plays N if at least one media outlet reports D. If competition dominates bias
and there is no herd behavior, then this strategy of player 1 inuences the media
outlets to report truthfully. However, in the imperfect information case, when media
outlets truthfully report and it turns out that only one outlet has reported D and
the other all outlets have reported Hs, player 1 has an incentive to change her action
from N to B. This is because the probability that player 2 is hawkish is much
higher than the probability that player 2 is dovish. Since player 1 would not play
her strategy suggested above, the media outlets lose an incentive to report truthfully.
In this case, if there is herd behavior in reporting, then even when all media outlets
except one outlet have reported Hs, the probability that player 2 is hawkish might
not be high. This is because most of the outlets just followed previous reports and
accordingly just a few media outlets reveal their information about player 2s type.
Consequently, if the payo¤ ! of player 1 in the NN outcome is large enough, then
player 1 can rationally play N even when all media outlets except one outlet have
reported Hs. Therefore, player 1 can achieve her favored outcome, NN . In this sense,
media outletsherd behavior in reporting is considered to improve player 1s expected
payo¤.
This model focuses on the e¤ect of media bias as a part of general endeavor to
understand the media as a means of information transmission. A large literature
about the media, on the other hand, focuses on the occurrence and persistence of
media bias. Most of them assume irrational players to a certain extent and explain
why media bias happens and continues based on the irrational player assumption.
Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005), Baron (2006), and Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006)
studied media bias and examined whether media competition can reduce media bias.
Baron explained that the occurrence and persistence of media bias can arise from
the supply side by journalists who are willing to accept lower wages for the sake of
their discretion. Mullainathan, Shleifer, Gentzkow, and Shapiro showed that media
bias can, however, come from the demand side. They argued that prot-maximizing
media outlets could cater to the preferences or prior beliefs of their audience, who
can be considered as irrational players, to increase the demand for their products;
this behavior represents media bias. Regarding media competition, Mullainathan,
Shleifer, and Baron concluded that competition by itself may not be powerful enough
to reduce media bias. On the other hand, Gentzkow and Shapiro found that competi-
tion among independently owned media outlets can lead to lower bias. In the present
model, similar to Gentzkow and Shapiro, su¢ ciently strong competition can lead the
media outlets to report truthfully.
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6 Conclusions
Suppose that receivers are in a situation of potential conict and a sender reports
its information through the news media. In addition, suppose that the sender has a
conditional preference for maintaining its credibility in reporting accurate informa-
tion. Then even when the sender and the receivers have contradictory preferences,
the sender can make the receivers play the senders favored outcome. This result
extends to the imperfect information case. That is, when the information includes
noise, if the information is informative enough, then the sender can achieve its favored
outcome.
This result does not change even when the sender values more its credibility in
reporting accurate information. This is because the availability of the information
from the sender removes the possibility for the players to play Ns. However, if there
are more than one sender, then the result could change. If competition among the
senders is strong enough or if at least two senders report simultaneously, then the
senders can be forced to report truthfully, and as a result, the receiversexpected
payo¤s can improve. Therefore, enough competition and simultaneous reporting can
be a solution to the media manipulation problem in this study.
The ndings derived from the arms race game could be extended to the general
coordination game with incomplete information where there can be more than two
receivers and also more than two actions for each receiver. This is because, just like
the receivers in the arms race game, receivers in the general coordination games cannot
completely ignore the report from senders. As a result, the senders can successfully
inuence the receivers to play their favored outcome by manipulating information
through the media.
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